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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-first century non-state actors are increasingly shaping 
governance at all levels.  Traditionally, international law and international 
institutions facilitated relationships among sovereign states, but now, 
corporations, non-governmental organizations, and other non-state actors are 
increasingly becoming participants rather than spectators.  One of the 
important areas of law that has undergone a dramatic transformation in 
recent decades is international investment law.  With the spread of investor-
state dispute settlement as a core dimension of bilateral investment treaties, 
foreign investors can directly challenge states’ actions in a range of areas.  A 
number of investor-state cases focus on public health regulations, including 
Philip Morris International’s recent challenges to the required health 
warnings and plain packaging for tobacco products in Uruguay and 
Australia.  These cases reflect the growing role of non-state actors in shaping 
the international system and highlight the potential implications for the 
regulation of public health.  
This Article analyzes the intersection of public health and international 
investment law and its implications for the future of investor-state dispute 
settlement.  Part II examines the recent claims brought against Uruguay and 
Australia amidst the growing role of tobacco related non-communicable 
diseases in shaping mortality in low and middle-income countries.   Part III 
traces the emergence of the modern system of investor-state dispute 
settlement.  Part IV compares the unique features of the international 
investment regime with international trade and other areas of law.  Part V 
assesses a range of proposed reforms to the international investment regime, 
including: direct exceptions for public health, more flexible standards of 
review, more restrictive conceptions of nationality, and the formation of a 
permanent appellate body.   
II.  TOBACCO, PLAIN PACKAGING, AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
With the adoption of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 
178 governments around the world committed to enact comprehensive 
national policies designed to reduce tobacco consumption through warnings 
and restrictions on the marketing of tobacco products and other strategies.1  
                                                                                                                   
 1 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166. 
The current ratifying parties may be found at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?s 
rc=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IX-4&chapter=9&lang=en. 
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The World Health Organization is currently encouraging national 
governments to adopt plain packaging for tobacco products because it can 
reduce the attractiveness of these products to potential consumers. The 
tobacco industry questions whether plain packaging is in fact effective in 
reducing smoking and argues that plain packaging regulations constitute an 
expropriation requiring compensation. 
In February of 2010, Phillip Morris International (PMI) filed an 
arbitration request against the government of Uruguay under a bilateral 
investment treaty between Uruguay and the government of Switzerland.  The 
claim alleged the plain packaging legislation, which “prohibits different 
packaging or presentations for cigarettes sold under a given brand,” unfairly 
deprived the company of its intellectual property rights.2  The Uruguayan 
government requires that 80% of packaging include graphic warnings and 
restricts tobacco advertising by allowing only a standard format for the use 
of brand names.3  PMI claimed that the regulations unfairly limited the use of 
its trademarks and intellectual property under the Uruguay-Switzerland 
bilateral investment treaty.4  
In late 2011, the Asian subsidiary of PMI filed an arbitration claim 
against Australia under its bilateral investment treaty with Hong Kong.  
Australian law restricts tobacco companies from displaying their brand 
names on packaging and mandates plain packaging on cigarette covers.  The 
Australian legislation requires that products be sold in packaging of a 
specified color, without logos, and that graphic health warnings must cover 
75% of the front of a pack and 90% of the back.5  PMI claimed “Australia’s 
proposed legislation would ‘effectively prohibit Philip Morris International 
from using its intellectual property’ ” and that absent the use of its logos, “its 
product would not be readily distinguishable to the consumers from the 
products of its competitors.”6  Among the potential obstacles to PMI’s claim 
is that it did not become the sole shareholder of PM Asia until about one year 
                                                                                                                   
 2 Philip Morris Brands SARL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 6–8 (July 2, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/defa 
ult/files/case-documents/italaw1531.pdf. 
 3 Anita Ritwik, Recent Development, Tobacco Packaging Arbitration and the State’s 
Ability to Legislate, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 523, 523–24 (2013). 
 4 See Philip Morris Brands SARL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 8 (July 2, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/italaw1531.pdf; Lauge Poulsen, The Relevance of Investment Treaties 
for Tobacco Control, Presentation to the European Parliament (Dec. 3, 2013). 
 5 Ritwik, supra note 3, at 525–26. 
 6 Id. at 526. 
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after the Australian government announced its plain packaging initiative.7  
As a result, PMI may not have had a legitimate expectation that its trademark 
would not be affected through its investments in Australia.  The Australian 
courts previously rejected PMI’s claims.8  
Australia’s adoption of plain packaging sparked a number of other 
countries to take another look at this approach to regulation.  In fact, even 
countries such as Canada, which had previously been dissuaded from this 
approach, resurrected proposals for more comprehensive labeling 
requirements for tobacco products.9  The government of New Zealand in 
principle agreed to pursue plain packaging regulations and the proposal is 
now under consideration in the New Zealand Parliament.10  The United 
Kingdom announced that it would evaluate the effectiveness of plain 
packaging restrictions, and Ireland is also considering adopting plain 
packaging regulations.11  Turkey, which has among the highest rates of 
smoking in the world, is also considering proposals to ban logos and brand 
names on tobacco packaging.12   
Although the tobacco industry argues that plain packaging is not an 
effective public health strategy, recent research seems to confirm that plain 
packaging can reduce the demand for tobacco products.13  In Australia, 
research indicates that people using plain packaged cigarettes, as compared 
to branded packs, perceived their cigarettes to be lower in quality and less 
satisfying.  People using plain packaged cigarettes were more likely to have 
thought about quitting in the past week and to view quitting as a higher 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in 
International Agreements, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 910 (2012). 
 8 Poulsen, supra note 4. 
 9 Drew Tyler, The Tobacco Industry’s Interest in Public International Law is Heating Up, 
16  ONT. BAR ASSOC. 3 (2013). 
 10 Parliament Health Committee Passes Plain Packaging Bill, 3NEWS, http://www.oba.org/ 
en/pdf/sec_news_int_jul13_Tobacco_Tyler.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2014). 
 11 Cigarette Packaging: Republic of Ireland Bid to Ban Branded Tobacco, MANUFACTURING 
J., http://www.manufacturing-journal.net/economy-news/1580-cigarette-packaging-republic-of-
ireland-bid-to-ban-branded-tobacco (last visited Aug. 27, 2014). 
 12 More Bans on Smoking to be Introduced in Turkey, HURRIET DAILY NEWS (Istanbul) 
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/more-bans-on-smoking-to-be-introduced-
in-turke y.aspx?pageID=238&nID=57363&NewsCatID=341. 
 13 Rachel Pechey et al., The Impact of Plain Packaging on Smoking in Adults and Children, 
13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 18 (2013). 
2014] PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH  145 
 
 
priority in their lives.14  Similarly, health warnings with graphic pictures 
have been demonstrated to reduce the demand for cigarettes.15  Plain 
packaging tends to increase the salience and believability of these pictorial 
warning labels.16  A recent survey in Australia revealed that daily smoking 
rates declined by 15% between 2010 and December of 2013.17  Thus, the 
early evidence suggests that plain packaging is associated with greater 
interest in quitting among adult smokers.18   
The arbitration claim against Uruguay challenges both the size of the 
required graphic warnings and also the limits on the use of misleading logos, 
descriptors and colors on tobacco packaging.  The size of the graphic 
warning label in the context of the Uruguay regulation is unlikely to be 
rejected by arbitrators, but it is possible that the requirement that tobacco 
companies use only one variant of an individual brand could be successfully 
challenged.19  One of the key issues will be the level of scrutiny that will be 
applied to the regulation by the arbitrators.  Investment tribunals generally 
give less deference to government policy decisions in areas such as health 
than does the World Trade Organization’s appellate body.20  Uruguay argued 
that Article 2(1) of its bilateral investment treaty with Switzerland excludes 
public health measures, but the arbitral tribunal found that this exclusion 
only applied to pre-established laws and regulations and that Article 2(1) did 
not create an exception to substantive obligations with respect to investment 
that had already been legally admitted.21 
                                                                                                                   
 14 See Melanie Wakefield et al., Introduction Effects of the Australian Plain Packaging 
Policy on Adult Smokers: A Cross-Sectional Study, BMJ OPEN (2013), http://bmjopen.bmj. 
com/content/3/7/e003175.full.pdf+html.   
 15 See James Thrasher et al., Estimating the Impact of Pictorial Health Warnings and 
“Plain” Cigarette Packaging: Evidence from Experimental Auctions Among Adult Smokers in 
the United States, 102 HEALTH POL’Y 41, 41 (2011). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Jamie Smyth, Australia Smoking Rates Tumble After Plain Packaging Shift, FIN. TIMES 
(Sydney) (July 16, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c4016952-0d4a-11e4-bcb2-00144fe 
abdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3ERm1TQfn. 
 18 Wakefield et al., supra note 14. 
 19 Benn McGrady, Implications of Ongoing Trade and Investment Disputes Concerning 
Tobacco: Philip Morris v. Uruguay, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF 
CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 4–5 (Tania Voon et al. eds., 2012). 
 20 See Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International 
Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004), available at http://schoolarship.law.upenn. 
edu/jil/vol36/iss1/1/. 
 21 See Philip Morris Brands SARL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 57 (July 2, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/defa 
ult/files/case-documents/italaw1531.pdf. 
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In the Australian case, the arbitrators may never reach the merits because 
they have split the case into a jurisdictional phase and a merits phase and 
PMI’s jurisdictional claim suffers from the timing of its purchase of PM 
Asia.  However, if the panel reaches the merits, PMI will still need to defend 
its claim that the regulations “substantially deprive” the company of the 
value of its shares, which are dependent on the use of the intellectual 
property of its products.22  In responding to the further claim that the plain 
packaging regulations are not “for a proven public purpose related to the 
internal needs of Australia” the Australian government may be aided 
somewhat by the fact that both the World Health Organization and the 
Secretariat of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control have 
expressed support for the plain packaging initiative.  On the other hand, PMI 
is also claiming that the regulation violates an umbrella clause of the 
investment agreement that requires Australia to uphold any obligation it has 
entered into with regard to investment with other parties, including the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).23 
Regardless of the outcomes of these cases, there is little doubt that these 
claims are having a significant deterrent effect on other countries.  In 
Namibia, substantially similar plain packaging regulations are law but have 
not been implemented based on fear of retaliation by the industry.24  New 
Zealand is awaiting the outcome of the Australian arbitration before moving 
ahead with plain packaging.25  For Uruguay, the potential cost of litigation 
alone nearly led to a reversal by the government.  Even if PMI loses, 
prevailing governments will almost certainly still have to pay legal costs 
which average approximately $8 million.26  These costs are prohibitive for 
many governments in low and middle-income countries and will likely 
continue to dissuade many countries from adopting plain packaging. 
                                                                                                                   
 22 Notice of Arbitration, Australia/Hong Kong Agreement for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, at 13 (Nov. 21, 2011), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0 
665.pdf. 
 23 Tania Voon et al., Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements: 
Striving for Coherence in National and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
AFTER THE CRISIS: A TALE OF FRAGMENTED DISCIPLINES 18 (C.L. Lim & Bryan Mercurio eds.) 
(forthcoming 2015). 
 24 Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Firms’ Strategy Limits Poorer Nations’ Smoking Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/health/tobacco-industry-tactics-li 
mit-poorer-nations-smoking-laws.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 25 Poulsen, supra note 4.  
 26 Eric Crosbie et al., Health Preemption Behind Closed Doors: Trade Agreements and 
Fast-Track Authority, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 7 (Sept. 2014). 
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The potential stakes in terms of global public health of these cases are 
quite substantial.  Currently, 80% of all deaths from non-communicable 
diseases (NCD) occur in low and middle-income countries.  Tobacco use is 
one of the leading causes of these NCD deaths around the world.  If current 
smoking patterns persist, tobacco will kill approximately one billion people 
this century, mostly in low and middle-income countries.  As rates of 
smoking have declined in the United States and some other high-income 
countries, the industry has aggressively expanded its marketing efforts in low 
and middle-income countries.27  Between 1970 and 2000, tobacco 
consumption more than doubled in the developing world.  In Indonesia, for 
example, two-thirds of all adult males are smokers.28   
Recent investment claims by the tobacco industry reflect its lack of 
success in using domestic courts and other forums to challenge regulation.  
The industry unsuccessfully sought to use the multilateral trade regime and 
the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT) to open up markets in 
Southeast Asia.29  Before the founding of the WTO, GATT arbitrators 
supported comprehensive tobacco control legislation and the industry 
subsequently shifted its focus to investment treaties.30  In 1990, the GATT 
panel agreed that Thailand’s ban on importing cigarettes violated the GATT.  
However, the panel also found that smoking constituted such a significant 
health risk and Thailand could restrict sales that ban advertising as long as it 
did not discriminate against foreign products.31  The industry is also having 
limited success in suing in national courts, as evidenced by the Australian 
example and by a recent challenge in Norway.  In 2012, the Norwegian 
courts ruled in favor of a challenged prohibition on the display of tobacco 
products at the point of sale under the European Economic Agreement.32  As 
a result of these unfavorable rulings within domestic courts and beyond, the 
                                                                                                                   
 27 M.J. Friedrich, Tobacco Marketing Reaches Children in Developing Countries, 310 
JAMA 2030 (2013). 
 28 Prabhat Jha & Richard Peto, Global Effects of Smoking, of Quitting, and of Taxing 
Tobacco, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 60 (2014).  
 29 Glen Frankel, U.S. Aided Cigarette Firms in Conquests Across Asia, WASH. POST (Nov. 
17, 1996), http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tobacco/stories/asia.htm. 
 30 Ross Mackenzie, Why Bilateral Investment Treaties are the Last Refuge of Big Tobacco, 
THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 16, 2012), http://theconversation.com/why-bilateral-investment-tre 
aties-are-the-last-refuge-of-big-tobacco-8880.  
 31 Frankel, supra note 29. 
 32 Benn McGrady & Alexandra Jones, Tobacco Control and Beyond: The Broader 
Implications of United States-Clove Cigarettes for Non-Communicable Diseases, 39 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 265 (2013). 
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tobacco industry is increasingly turning towards the investor-state dispute 
settlement system to challenge national policies such as plain packaging.33 
III.  EMERGENCE OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN  
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
The rise of investor-state dispute settlement is closely connected to the 
spread of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the late twentieth century.  
For a long time, diplomatic protection and investment contracts served as the 
basis for defending the interests of foreign investors.  It was only after World 
War II that the modern system of investor-state dispute resolution took 
shape.  National governments sought to secure greater legal protections for 
investors through bilateral agreements since the first BIT was signed in 1959 
between West Germany and Pakistan.34  Beginning in the 1990s there was a 
dramatic expansion in the number of BITs around the world.35  While there 
were only approximately 100 BITs in 1980, there were 500 by 1992, 1,000 
by 1994, 1,500 by 1998, 2,000 by 2000 and 2,500 by 2005.36  The diffusion 
of BITs is closely associated with competitive pressures among developing 
countries seeking to gain access to foreign investment.  Among the best 
predictors of BIT ratification is whether countries with a similar work force, 
infrastructure, and similar export profile had ratified them.37  Countries are 
more likely to sign BITs when their competitors for investment have done so 
and when they are subject to IMF loan conditions.38  The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was one of the first trade agreements to 
                                                                                                                   
 33 At the same time as these investment arbitrations are moving forward, a case is also 
being heard by a tribunal of the World Trade Organization in which a number of countries are 
claiming that Australia is in violation of its trade obligations under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.  See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New 
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); 
Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Implications of WTO Law for Plain Packaging of Tobacco 
Products, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES, supra 
note 19, at 109. 
 34 Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 655 (1990).  
 35 ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATIES (2009). 
 36 Beth Simmons, Bargaining over BITs: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of 
International Investment, 66 WORLD POL. 12, 31 (2014).  
 37 Id. at 21. 
 38 Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 295. 
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incorporate investor-state dispute settlement as part of its investment chapter.  
Mexico had never before signed an investment treaty before NAFTA,39 and 
two high-income countries, such as the United States and Canada, had never 
before entered into a comprehensive investment agreement.40   
A broader effort to create a multilateral investment treaty governing 
investment, known as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), was 
launched by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in 1995.41  This effort faltered at the end of the twentieth century in 
the face of substantial opposition from a number of developing countries and 
civil society actors.42  At the time, one of the strongest objections was that 
the proposed MAI gave foreign corporations the right to sue governments 
over health and other protective legislation.43  Subsequently, trade 
agreements have become the most important multilateral mechanism for 
expanding BITs and the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) includes 
provisions for investor-state dispute settlement. Many of these investment 
chapters within trade agreements have largely mirrored the investor-state 
dispute settlement provisions initially put forward in the context of the 
MAI.44 
Responding to recent concerns catalyzed by the claims brought by PMI, 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has suggested that the U.S. 
will support allowing public interest exceptions for health, safety, and 
environmental protection, but it remains unclear how broad or effective such 
exceptions might prove to be in practice.  USTR initially proposed 
provisions which would have “explicitly recognized the unique status of 
tobacco products from a health and regulatory perspective” and would 
“include language in the ‘general exceptions’ chapter that allows health 
authorities in TPP governments to adopt regulations that impose origin-
                                                                                                                   
 39 William Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: 
Reflection on the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2006). 
 40 J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor State Arbitration 
Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 682, 692 (2007).   
 41 Razeen Sappideen & Ling Ling He, Investor-State Arbitration: The Roadmap from the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 40 FED. L. 
REV. 207, 209 (2012).   
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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neutral, science based restrictions on specific tobacco products.”45  However, 
a subsequent proposal by the USTR merely suggested that a general 
exception that covered health would be included in the investment provisions 
which was viewed by many as a retreat from its earlier position.46  It remains 
unclear what will ultimately emerge from the TPP negotiations and how such 
an exception might be interpreted in practice by different arbitral tribunals.  
Unlike the trade regime in which the WTO appellate body ensures some 
level of consistency across arbitration panels, there is no such possibility of 
appeal to a permanent body within the investment regime.  Reversing 
arbitration decisions is still possible through the process of annulment but is 
quite difficult given that the grounds for granting an annulment are extremely 
narrow.47 
IV.  UNIQUE FEATURES OF ISDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
International investment law is one of the few areas of international law 
in which non-state actors, defined as investors, are co-equals with states.48  
Among the many unique features of investor-state dispute settlement within 
the investment regime is the way it treats nationality.  Almost universally, 
investment agreements provide greater rights and protections for foreign 
investors than they do for domestic investors.  These rights are guaranteed 
only for those investors who are nationals of a specific country that has 
entered into an investment agreement with the host country.  However, the 
requirements in terms of nationality are often quite formalistic based on 
criteria such as the place of incorporation.49  Ownership can be indirect so 
long as beneficial ownership at relevant times is linked to a specific foreign 
country that has entered into an investment agreement with the host state.50  
Such foreign investors need not exhaust local remedies nor even engage with 
                                                                                                                   
 45 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TPP TOBACCO PROPOSAL (May, 18, 2012), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2012/may/tpp-tobacco-prop 
osal. 
 46 Andrew Mitchell, Tania S. Voon & Devon Whittle, Public Health and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, 4 ASIAN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014). 
 47 Simmons, supra note 36, at 38. 
 48 Jason Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? 
Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2010). 
 49 Jean Francois Hebert, Issues of Corporate Nationality in Investment Arbitration in 
Improving International Investment Agreements, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTION AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., Kluwer, 2010). 
 50 Robert Wisner & Nick Gallus, Nationality Requirements in Investor—State Arbitration, 5 
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 927, 934 (2004).  
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national judicial structures in any way before proceeding to international 
arbitration.  Such arbitration claims need not involve home state support but 
can instead be brought directly and independently by a foreign investor.  
Investment tribunals are significantly different from the arbitration process 
in related fields such as international trade.  In the trade regime, there is greater 
transparency, the possibility of appeal to an established appellate body, and 
generally a multilateral rather than a bilateral treaty basis for arbitration claims.  
While multilateral trade disputes under the WTO peaked in the late 1990s, 
investment disputes under International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) are just now peaking. Another somewhat unique dimension 
of the investment dispute settlement regime is the North-South axis of most 
cases.  Only 4% of the respondents in ICSID investment claims are high-
income while 73% of GATT and WTO respondents were high-income.51  In 
recent years investors have won 70% of known cases while since 1987 they 
won only 31% of such cases.52  Some 29% of the claims related to the oil and 
gas sectors while 42% related to the service sector.53 
Although a common rationale for BITs is that they are important for low 
and middle-income countries in attracting foreign investment, there is some 
debate over whether this is actually the case in practice.  Some scholars have 
found little evidence of a positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in states that adopt BITs.54  However, Tim Buthe and Helen Milner found 
that more FDI is catalyzed by trade agreements that include strong 
mechanisms for credible commitment such as investor-state dispute 
settlement.55  Perhaps comprehensive trade and investment agreements are 
more important inducements for foreign investment than BITs alone.    
The uniqueness of the investment regime, especially in comparison with 
the trade regime, has been explained in functional terms by Alan Sykes among 
others.56  Sykes argues that capital importers require credible commitments 
from governments that they will not engage in expropriation, and that a private 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Simmons, supra note 36, at 19.   
 52 Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite 
Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2010).    
 53 Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1, 41 (2007).    
 54 Yackee, supra note 48, at 399, 405 n.35, 409–10.  
 55 Tim Buthe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into 
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through International Trade Agreements?, 52 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 741, 745–46 (2008).   
 56 Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Law: Standing and 
Remedy, J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 633–42 (2005).   
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right of action for damages is the most efficient mechanism for such a 
commitment.57  By contrast, the types of commitments within trade 
agreements are better seen as between governments and, therefore the 
reciprocal possibility of trade sanctions is a better enforcement mechanism.58  
In this view, the purpose of investment agreements is to reduce the potential 
risk of expropriation for private investors so a private right of action that can 
trigger monetary compensation is a relatively inexpensive commitment device 
for states.59  In trade, sanctions are used in part because they are more effective 
at inducing governments to comply with their obligations.60  Furthermore, 
developing countries are likely to reject a system based on monetary damages 
within the trade regime.61  Thus, trade remains essentially a domain in which 
states shape enforcement while investment is increasingly an arena of law in 
which non-state actors are the primary enforcers of state obligations.   
While the investment regime might be functional from a certain 
perspective, it is also relatively unique in the way that it empowers non-state 
actors relative to states and in the way that it involves nation-states 
substantially limiting their own sovereign powers.62  Another quite plausible 
assessment is that the investment regime is at the early stages of the type of 
transformation that the trade regime underwent in the wake of the 
establishment of the WTO.63  While the trade regime is now more successful at 
incorporating concerns related to human health, this was not always the case, 
and it is not impossible that the investment regime could move in a similar 
direction.64  Ultimately, the evolution of the investment regime is part of a 
much wider story about the rise of non-state actors that has been characterized 
as one of the most important dimensions of globalization.65  The rise of 
powerful non-state actors in the twenty-first century has contributed to an 
important shift away from public authority at the national level.66   
                                                                                                                   
 57 Id. at 631.   
 58 Id. at 633.   
 59 Id. at 662. 
 60 Id. at 654.  
 61 Id. at 660. 
 62 See Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos?: Foreign Investment Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV. 386, 395 
(2014). 
 63 Wagner, supra note 20, at 5.   
 64 Id. at 57–58, 67.   
 65 Peter J. Spiro, Constraining Global Corporate Power: A Short Introductions, 46 VAND. 
J. INT’L L. 1101, 1101 (2013).   
 66 Id. at 1102–03.   
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V.  THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
Defenders of the current international investment regime argue that it 
should be viewed through the lens of private international law and that the 
defining features of arbitration should continue to be confidentiality and the 
autonomy of the disputing parties.67  Under this view, deference to state 
regulatory policies is in tension with the tradition in commercial arbitration 
of the equality of arms.  Yet as international investment claims increasingly 
reach matters of broader public concern such as health, many critics of the 
system suggest that it falls short of the standards of transparency and 
accountability that are expected in other areas of public law.68  Critics of the 
current international investment regime have suggested a number of possible 
reforms to the system of investor-state dispute settlement.  These proposed 
reforms range from greater transparency, to a permanent appellate body, to 
exclusions and safe harbors for health and other concerns, to more flexible 
standards of review of state regulation.  Each of these approaches faces 
challenges and not one of these reforms alone is likely to fundamentally 
transform the current international investment regime. 
The investment regime has recently made some noticeable shifts in the 
direction of greater transparency.  The demands for greater transparency in 
the investment regime were sparked in part by the public response to a 2000 
decision under NAFTA, Metalclad v. United Mexican States, where the 
tribunal found that expropriation includes “covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in 
whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonable-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of [the] property.”69  In 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission issued an interpretive note that stated that nothing in the 
agreement precluded parties from releasing documents submitted to or issued 
by tribunals.70  While NAFTA arbitrations were subsequently subject to 
certain transparency requirements, it was only last year that the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted new 
                                                                                                                   
 67 See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the 
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 69 ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, at 28 (Claims Resolution Trib. 2000), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0510.pdf. 
 70 Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes – Adoption, 
Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1369 (2006). 
154 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:141 
 
 
rules designed to help expand transparency throughout its arbitration process.  
Under these rules, which will only apply to arbitrations based on investment 
treaties concluded after April 1, 2014, arbitration panels can accept 
submissions related to treaty interpretation from third parties as long as they 
do not “disrupt or unduly burden the arbitral proceedings, or unfairly 
prejudice any disputing party.”71   
While transparency is often viewed as a key mechanism for fostering 
accountability, the case of investment arbitration may be more complicated.  
In recent years, efforts to foster greater transparency within ICSID have led 
to a range of institutional reforms that have failed to promote disclosure in 
cases in which the parties are most committed to secrecy.72  In cases 
involving investments with long time horizons, where a particular party 
expects that it will lose, or that might send negative signals to investors about 
state credibility, the proceedings of arbitrations are still generally kept 
secret.73  In addition, investment arbitration remains a very obscure arena of 
international law to most non-experts.  Thus the feedback mechanism 
through which transparency catalyzes accountability in other sectors is 
limited by the lack of effective intermediary actors.74 
Another proposed reform of the investment regime is the idea of creating 
a permanent appellate body or other mechanisms to foster greater 
consistency and predictability in the system.  Currently, most BITs give the 
choice of forum between UNCITRAL and ICSID exclusively to the investor 
bringing an arbitration claim.75  Some scholars have suggested that there is 
increasingly movement toward a multilateral system within the investment 
regime that is grounded on bilateral treaties.76  As the number of investor 
claims has increased dramatically, the inconsistency of decisions by 
                                                                                                                   
 71 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Rules on Transparency in 
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investment arbitration panels has also become more widespread.77  One 
possible response to this dynamic is the creation of an independent appellate 
body with the power to review arbitration awards similar to that which 
already exists within the WTO.78  While such an appellate body could make 
a real contribution to the consistency of investment rulings, it is not clear that 
it would be any more protective of public health regulations, and many 
scholars argue that it is ultimately unlikely to happen.79 
Another approach to reforming the investment regime that seems to be 
gaining some traction is the idea of creating explicit exceptions and exclusions 
for government regulation of health and other areas.  For example, the recent 
investment agreement between Australia and Singapore, and the recent 
agreement between Canada and China create a general exception for health 
and the environment based on Article XX of the GATT.80  Article XX creates 
a general exception for regulations “necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.”81  Despite the precedent from the trade regime for the 
adoption of an explicit health exception, the number of investment agreements 
which include such a provision remains relatively small.82 
The most recently revised United States model BIT reflects to some 
degree this shift toward broader exceptions.  The U.S. model BIT is highly 
significant because it generally serves as the template not just for U.S. 
negotiators but also for many other countries around the world in designing 
new BITs.83  The 2012 version incorporates new language on environmental 
and labor issues and explicitly recognizes that state parties have the right to 
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exercise discretion in terms of implementing environmental policies and 
regulations.84  There is also new language on health that states, “except in 
rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.”85  Beyond these general exceptions, some scholars have 
suggested that investment agreements ought to explicitly exclude tobacco 
products from the coverage of the agreement.86   
Another set of reforms that have been proposed by a range of scholars 
focus on the standard of review that arbitrators apply in evaluating 
regulations of national governments.  Some have argued that strict standards 
of review are not well matched with important questions of national 
regulation and have suggested that there should be a “margin of 
appreciation” provided to national governments by investment tribunals.87   
One such formulation is the least restrictive alternative test which has been 
applied by arbitration panels in the trade regime and requires arbitrators to 
initially determine if the state is pursuing a permissible objective, whether 
those measures are necessary, and, finally, to analyze the possible 
alternatives to the challenged measure.88  However, others have challenged 
the idea that more deferential standards of review are truly necessary or 
would even be effective in the context of the investment regime.89  Another 
weakness of the margin of appreciation approach is that it may not be easily 
transferrable to the context of ad-hoc tribunals as reflected in the fact that so 
far investment tribunals that have utilized the margin of appreciation have 
applied different standards of review in practice.90 
A related approach to limiting the discretion of arbitrators by establishing 
more flexible standards of review is to borrow from the arena of 
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administrative law and create new accountability mechanisms for the entire 
arbitration process.  A number of scholars have highlighted the way in which 
the investment arbitration regime transfers power to expert decision-makers 
and lacks the mechanisms of political control that are required of similar 
expert bodies within the context of the nation-state.91  To the degree that 
investor-state arbitration is emerging as an institutional structure similar to 
other international institutions, there is an argument for applying principles 
of global administrative law that include transparency, participation, and the 
right to appeal or seek further review.92  
Broader participation could include allowing other non-state actors, 
beyond investors, to participate in the arbitration process.  At a minimum, 
this might involve submitting amicus or other submissions to arbitration 
panels, but it could also involve a role for other non-state actors in 
appointing arbitrators or in bringing or defending claims more directly before 
such panels.  In some limited arbitration cases, non-governmental 
organizations have also been granted amicus curiae status.93  In the 2001 
Methanex Corp. v. United States case under NAFTA, the arbitral tribunal 
declared that it had the power to accept amicus briefs based on the 
experience of the trade regime but rejected the request of non-parties to 
attend the oral hearings.94  Later in 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission confirmed that tribunals had the discretionary power to accept 
submissions from non-parties to the dispute.95  ICSID panels historically 
refused amicus status to NGOs until a revision of its rule of procedure in 
2006, which allowed NGOs to attend hearings if none of the parties objected, 
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and allowed panels to accept written submissions from third parties under 
certain conditions.96   
Given the somewhat strained claims to nationality involved in the PMI 
challenge to Australia, refining the definition of nationality within the 
context of BITs might be an important reform.  Under the rules of the 
NAFTA Investment Chapter, for example, redress can be denied only “if 
investors of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and the enterprise has 
no substantial business activities” in the alleged home state.97  Under ICSID 
rules, the nationality that determines jurisdiction is defined as extending “to 
any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a contracting 
state . . . and a national of another contracting state.”98  Currently, nationality 
is determined largely by relevant national laws, but this leads to a great deal 
of inconsistency in the application of these rules and opens up the possibility 
of gaming the system through forum shopping or nationality shopping.   
The claims brought by the tobacco industry have generated a substantial 
backlash and have increased the resistance of some states in signing on to 
new BITs.99  Yet, even reforms that alter the terms and definitions of new 
BITs are unlikely to fundamentally re-shape the overall system, given the 
large number of existing agreements.   As a result, there is growing interest 
in some quarters in the re-negotiation of existing BITs. While renegotiation 
by a handful of governments is unlikely to significantly shift the international 
investment regime, the European Union is interested in renegotiating the 
existing BITs adopted by countries in the region using the authority that was 
allocated to it under the Lisbon Treaty.100  Since, collectively, the EU states 
are party to more than 1,200 BITs, such an intervention by the EU holds the 
potential to change as many as half of all existing BITs. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The emerging system of investor-state dispute settlement is one of the 
most dramatic examples of the growing influence of non-state actors in 
shaping the international system in the twenty-first century.  While non-state 
actors are increasingly participants in a range of areas of international law 
and assuming more substantive roles within many international institutions, 
there is perhaps no other field in which non-state actors have such formal 
authority relative to states.  As investment arbitration claims intersect more 
often with state regulatory policies, public health is becoming a central 
battleground in which private investors are directly challenging state action.  
The recent claims against Australia and Uruguay over plain packaging 
highlight the tensions within the investor-state dispute settlement system and 
are likely to catalyze further interest in reforming the current system to better 
accommodate competing interests related to public health. 
Whether one views international investment as a unique arena requiring 
its own approach or a relatively new field which is likely to undergo an 
evolution similar to the trade regime, investor-state dispute settlement is at a 
critical juncture.  The past failures of multilateral efforts to shape the 
investment arena have given rise to an extremely fragmented system based 
largely on a patchwork of bilateral agreements. Yet given the global reach of 
many investors and the common regulatory challenges facing many states, 
investor-state dispute settlement is increasingly assuming many of the 
characteristics of a multilateral system, especially as it is incorporated into 
multilateral trade agreements.  The challenges to plain packaging in Australia 
and Uruguay will almost certainly shape the response by national 
governments around the world to tobacco regulation.  These arbitral 
decisions are likely to resonate far beyond the concrete dispute over plain 
packaging and influence the direction of public health regulation and the 
terms of investor-state dispute settlement in a range of areas.  At the same 
time, these decisions and the broader public health concerns that they 
implicate could very well contribute to greater momentum for a 
comprehensive multilateral approach to private investment and public health. 
       
